Cyber Posture

CVE-2026-5446

N/A

Published: 09 April 2026

Published
09 April 2026
Modified
13 April 2026
KEV Added
Patch
CVSS Score N/A
EPSS Score 0.0003 9.3th percentile
Risk Priority 0 60% EPSS · 20% KEV · 20% CVSS

Description

In wolfSSL, ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 reuse an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record. Because wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the MagicCrypto SDK with no internal counter,…

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and because the explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This vulnerability affects wolfSSL builds configured with --enable-aria and the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK (a non-default, opt-in configuration required for Korean regulatory deployments). AES-GCM is not affected because wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an internal invocation counter independently of the call-site guard.

Security SummaryAI

CVE-2026-5446 affects the wolfSSL cryptographic library, specifically ARIA-GCM cipher suites used in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2. The vulnerability stems from reusing an identical 12-byte GCM nonce for every application-data record, as wc_AriaEncrypt is stateless and passes the caller-supplied IV verbatim to the proprietary MagicCrypto SDK without an internal counter. The explicit IV is zero-initialized at session setup and never incremented in non-FIPS builds. This issue is limited to wolfSSL builds configured with the non-default --enable-aria option and the MagicCrypto SDK, an opt-in setup required for Korean regulatory deployments. AES-GCM cipher suites are unaffected, as wc_AesGcmEncrypt_ex maintains an independent internal invocation counter.

Attackers positioned to observe encrypted TLS 1.2 or DTLS 1.2 traffic using vulnerable ARIA-GCM cipher suites could exploit the nonce reuse, associated with CWE-323 (Reused Initialization Vector), to potentially decrypt application data or forge records. Exploitation requires the target to be using the specific non-default wolfSSL configuration with MagicCrypto SDK.

Mitigation is provided through a patch in the wolfSSL GitHub pull request at https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10111. Security practitioners should update affected wolfSSL builds and avoid the --enable-aria configuration with MagicCrypto SDK unless required for regulatory compliance.

Details

CWE(s)

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise TechniquesAI

Insufficient information to map techniques.
Confidence: LOW · MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v18.1

References